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# **National Intelligence Daily**

Thursday 25 August 1983

Top Secret

CPAS NID 83-200JX 25 August 1983

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
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


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## **IRAN: More Antiregime Demonstrations**

regime.	25X1
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Iranian exiles claim that thousands participated in Mashhad and that one of the clerics is now under	25X1
house arrest. On Saturday President Khamenei flew to Mashhad, where he has been conferring with religious and lay officials.	25X1
Earlier this summer a conservative senior cleric in Esfahan provoked demonstrations that led to clashes between his supporters and those of the regime, according to Iranian exile media. Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani was dispatched to mediate that dispute.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Both the senior clerics in Mashhad and their colleague in Esfahan have been outspoken opponents of the more radical and inept aspects of the regime. The most senior of the ayatollahs in Mashhad, who warned in 1981 of a possible domestic "explosion," has made disparaging remarks about the qualifications of some officials. The cleric now under house arrest last month publicly shredded a picture of Ayatollah Khomeini and has labeled all regime policies "un-Islamic."	25X1
Comment: The demonstrations in Mashhad and Esfahan are a greater challenge to the Khomeini regime than the largely spontaneous protests over economic hardships that erupted throughout the country last month. The regime is reluctant to crack down hard on widely respected conservative clerics who hold	25X1
peaceful demonstrations when Khomeini himself has urged all clerics to become politically active	25/1
Nevertheless, the intervention by Khamenei and Rafsanjani emphasizes the seriousness with which the government views the demonstrations. Attempts to break up such protests would be likely to result in bloodshed, creating "martyrs" for the opposition. Failure to respond strongly, however, will encourage additional unrest.	

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### **INTERNATIONAL: Political Activity in the IAEA**

The developing countries may again challenge the US at the General Conference of the IAEA in October concerning the membership of Israel and South Africa.  Earlier this year Iraq and the black African states softened their criticism of Israel and South Africa in support of the efforts of the	25 <b>X</b> 1
West Europeans and the Soviets to persuade the US to resume participation in the IAEA.  Iraq, India, and perhaps Iran may sponsor resolutions challenging the conference credentials and possibly the IAEA membership of Tel Aviv and Pretoria. Egypt, Malaysia, and Nigeria are trying to persuade Iraq to settle for a declaration condemning the Israeli air attack in 1981 on the nuclear facility near Baghdad.	25X1 25X1
	25 <b>X</b> 1
Comment: The Iraqis probably know there are not enough votes	25X1
sentiment toward South Africa's status has not been tested for some time, partly because the South Africans have not attended General Conferences since 1979, when their credentials were rejected. If the South Africans were to try to attend this conference, their credentials probably would be rejected again. Failure to attend	25X1
does not protect Pretoria against motions to expel it from the IAEA.	25X1

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
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**Comment**: The USSR evidently sees little to be gained by supporting the opposition in the Philippines. It will try to use the incident to improve ties with Manila, which it hopes will eventually reduce the US military presence in the Philippines. The Soviets also probably hope that the assassination will complicate Washington's good relations with Marcos, and they will try to profit from any increased tensions.

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PAKISTAN: Developments in Opposition Campaign	•
Further violent incidents were reported from Sind Province yesterday, and lawyers in Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar boycotted courts to protest severe sentences given to rioters by martial law courts. The press reported arrests in Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir and attempts by students to close the national highway near Hyderabad, and two towns were shut down by general strikes.	25X1
riyadiabaa, ana two towns were shat down by general strikes.	25X1 25X1
Zia insists that local elections will be held on schedule next month in Sind and that he will not postpone his 10-day visit to Turkey, which is to begin on	25X1
Monday.	25X1
<b>Comment</b> : Zia's conciliatory language toward opposition politicians in a speech yesterday in Karachi suggests he may offer to begin a dialogue. At this stage, the opposition would be likely to demand unacceptable concessions before agreeing to talk. If Zia does call for talks, he probably will make some gesture to Sindhi	
opinion and try to divide the opposition.	25X1

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#### **TURKEY: Election Campaign Starts**

Under the statutes governing political parties and elections, the new parties are to conclude their organizing efforts today and begin a period of campaigning that will culminate in the general election of 6 November. The Conservative Nationalist Democracy and Motherland Parties and the center-left Populist Party are the only parties qualified to contest the election. They have to submit their lists of candidates to the military council by early next month.

**Comment:** President Evren and the ruling generals still seem intent on shaping the political process. They recently have disqualified two more parties, and they have closed down two newspapers and a weekly journal for running articles accusing the regime of stifling democracy. The candidates are prohibited by law from criticizing the generals' record or advocating any but middle-of-the-road policies, and the campaign thus is unlikely to be controversial in Turkey. It could draw negative comments, however, from West European critics of the generals' policies.

**NATO: Command Dispute Between Greece and Turkey** 

The Mediterranean portion of Trade Dagger 84, a NATO-wide control-of-shipping exercise, is in danger of being canceled because of a Greek-Turkish command dispute. Although the specifications were drafted by June 1982, Athens and Ankara have not yet agreed on how to divide the maritime area boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. NATO's Defense Planning Committee considered conducting the exercise only in the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic, despite the general belief that it was unrealistic to exclude the eastern Mediterranean. The US Mission to NATO says Alliance military authorities now have to try to find a compromise or omit the entire Mediterranean from the exercise.

**Comment**: Two previous such exercises, scheduled for 1980 and 1982, were canceled for the same reason. Holding the exercise in the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic would permit fuller Italian and French participation plus some Greek and Turkish involvement. Excluding the entire Mediterranean might increase Italy's concerns that the southern flank will become neglected in NATO planning.

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#### **WEST GERMANY: Possible Terrorist Attacks**

The head of the West German security service said on television on Tuesday that he fears there will be terrorist attacks this fall against trains carrying US or NATO munitions. He notes that radical groups in the anti-INF movement and individuals sympathetic to the terrorists have compiled exact timetables of weapon shipments.

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Comment: This statement makes public a threat that has concerned the West German Government for several months. Officials stress that most of the radicals want only to block or disrupt trains, but the presence of Red Army Faction sympathizers at some coordination sessions raises the possibility of armed attacks. Although the hard core of the Red Army Faction has been weakened by police action during the past year, police officials believe that it still may be able to organize an armed operation. The officials may hope that public revelation of this information will discourage attacks and mobilize public support for counterterrorist efforts.

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#### SWITZERLAND-WEST GERMANY: Decision To Buy Tank


The Swiss Federal Council announced yesterday its decision to acquire the West German Leopard II rather than the US M-1 as the Army's new main battle tank. Under a 15-year procurement program, the Swiss plan an initial order for 210 tanks, to be followed by a second order for another 210 in the late 1980s. West German arms producer Krauss-Maffei will supply the first 35 tanks, and the remaining 175 will be produced under license in Switzerland. The selection of the Leopard II reportedly was based on its superior technical merits as well as a determination that production of the Leopard II under license was more favorable economically than coproduction of the M-1.

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**Comment**: Although the Swiss choice was widely expected, the government's decision is likely to increase the prestige value of the Leopard II to other potential customers. Bonn could come under increasing pressure to relax controls on its export to non-NATO countries.

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
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USSR-US: Attack on Micronesian Policy		
The USSR has asked UN Secretary General Perez de circulate the text of a TASS statement of 12 August that a US of activities aimed at de facto annexation of the UN St Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The statement also a US of ignoring the legal rights of Micronesians and using t mandate as a cover for its military programs in the western	ccuses the rategic ccuses the the UN	25 <b>X</b> 1
Comment: The statement probably is part of an effort international support for the USSR's position on this issue General Assembly. The Soviets also may hope to encourar opposition among nonpermanent members of the Security the termination of the mandate on terms proposed by the Moscow wants to preempt any plan by Washington to use for military purposes if the US loses its bases in the Philips Soviets also object to the US proposal to deny military according to the US proposal to deny military according to the US proposal to the US proposal to the US proposal to the US proposal to deny military according to the US proposal to the US	e in the ge / Council to US. the islands pines. The	
islands by third parties.		25X1
AUSTRALIA: Increase in Defense Spending		
The government's budget for 1983-84, which was pres	sented to	
Parliament on Tuesday, will increase defense spending by		
in real terms to \$4.6 billion. The largest outlay for new equ		
almost \$440 million—is earmarked for the purchase of US fighter-bombers.	5 F/A-18	25X1
nginter-bollibers.		23/1
Comment: The increase underscores the government commitment to rebuild Australia's defense capability. Can		

**Comment**: The increase underscores the government's commitment to rebuild Australia's defense capability. Canberra hopes that new purchases and the restructuring of its military forces will enable it to move toward a more self-reliant, "continental" defense force and away from the "forward" defense strategy of the former government. In other areas, the expansionary budget follows the Labor Party's policy of redirecting spending toward social programs.

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# **Special Analysis**

ANGOLA: UNITA's Military Prospects	
UNITA's recent capture of Cangamba consolidates the insurgents' hold on southeastern Angola. Their battlefield successes, however, have not yet persuaded Luanda to negotiate, and UNITA plans to keep up the military pressure. Despite the growing belief in Pretoria that UNITA ultimately can achieve a military victory, the lightly armed insurgents probably cannot challenge the Cuban and Angolan forces holding the major cities and key garrisons.	25X
UNITA announced on 1 August that it was launching an offensive as part of its campaign to bring Luanda to the negotiating table. The insurgents assert that only negotiations between the contending parties will end the civil war. The offensive apparently is aimed at consolidating the insurgents' hold on the southeast, sustaining their campaign in central Angola, and expanding small-scale operations	
north to the Zairian border.	25X
	25X
To capture Cangamba, UNITA says it committed three of its brigades, or about 5,000 troops. There probably were 1,000 to 2,000 Angolan troops and possibly a small number of Cubans at Cangamba.	25X
Luanda claims it was forced to retreat by South African airstrikes, a charge Pretoria vehemently denies.	25X 25X
Both Luanda and Pretoria had aircraft capable of striking	
Cangamba in the region, and Angolan fighter-bombers probably provided air support during the battle.	25X
By capturing Cangamba, the insurgents secured their supply lines to the north. In the fighting, however, they suffered substantially higher casualties than in past operations.	25X
UNITA also claims recently to have captured several small towns in the north between Malange and Saurimo and to have continued	
continued	

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	guerrilla operations in cen reportedly gave priority to diamond mines there.			25X′
	Reactions in Luanda and	in Pretoria		
	The loss of Cangamba	will cause further alarm		
	which already was shaken the south from South Afric	by what it viewed as a can forces and from the	combined threat in insurgents.	25X <sup>2</sup>
				25X
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	Outlook			
	which are organized in light these forces still are far from	o have about 30,000 arn itly armed battalions and om Luanda.		25X <sup>2</sup>
	UNITA is neither equip	pped nor organized to co	onduct sustained	
	attacks against the larger	Angolan and Cuban gar	risons guarding	
	Menongue, Huambo, and The insurgents, however, or	can intensify their activity	y throughout the	
	countryside and increase I support.	_uanda's dependence or	n Cuban and Soviet	25X <sup>2</sup>
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